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A recent assertion by S. M. Stigler that Thomas Bayes was perhaps anticipated in the 
discovery of the result that today bears his name is exposed to further scrutiny here. The 
distinction between Bayes’ theorem and the inverse Bernoulli theorem is examined, and 
pertinent early writings on this matter are discussed. A careful examination of the difference 
between these two theorems leads to the conclusion that a result given by David Hartley in 
1749 is more in line with the inverse Bernoulli theorem than with Bayes’ result, and it is 
suggested that there is not sufficient evidence to remove Bayes from his place as originator of 
the method adopted. a 198a Academic RW, IW. 
Der Aufsatz untersucht eine ktirzlich von S. M. Stigler gemachte Feststellung n&her, da8 
das heute nach Thomas Bayes benannte Resultat vielleicht antizipiert wurde. Er tiberpruft 
die Unterscheidung zwischen Bayes’ Lehrsatz und dem inversen Bernoulli-Lehrsatz und 
er&tert in dieser Hinsicht relevante frtihere Schriften. Eine sorgf5ltige Untersuchung des 
Unterschiedes zwischen diesen beiden Lehrsatzen ergibt, daB das Resultat von David 
Hartley aus dem Jahre 1749 eher mit dem inversen Bernoulli-Lehrsatz als mit dem Resultat 
von Bayes iibereinstimmt. Daher wird daft& pladiert, Bayes weiterhin als Urheber der hier 
angewandten Methode zu akzeptieren. a 1988 Academic FWSS, IIIC. 
Nous mettons a l’epreuve l’assertion recente de S. M. Stigler voulant clue la decouverte 
de Thomas Bayes, qui Porte aujourd’hui son nom, ait peut-etre et6 anticipee. L’article met 
en evidence ce qui distingue le theoreme de Bayes du theoreme inverse de Bernoulli et 
anatyse les premiers textes relatifs u cette question. Un examen attentif des differences entre 
ces deux theoremes permet de conclure qu’un resultat de David Hartley obtenu en 1749 se 
situe davantage dam l’esprit du theoreme inverse de Bernoulli que de celui de Bayes. Ainsi 
peut-on penser qu’il n’y a pas lieu de remettre en question la place de Bayes comme 
initiateur de ta methode maintenant acceptee. 0 I988 Academic Press. 1~. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Some time ago I published an article [Dale 19821 in which I discussed the roles 
played by Thomas Bayes and Pierre Simon Laplace in the discovery of Bayed 
theorem. In a recent paper S. M. Stigler [1983] suggested the possibility that the 
latter result had been discovered by someone else before Bayes’ posthumous 
essay was published. Citing D. Hartley’s Observations on Man, His Frame, His 
Duty, and His Expectations [ 17491 as evidence, Stigler found the baIance of prob- 
abilities (by 3 to 1) to be in favor of Nicholas Saunderson rather than Bayes as the 
true originator of the theorem [ 11. More recently A. W. F. Edwards [1986] has 
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expressed doubt as to whether Hartley’s comment in fact referred to the Bayesian 
solution, “believing it more likely to refer to one of the non-Bayesian attempts at a 
solution discussed first by James Bernoulli (1713) and then by de Moivre (1738)” 
[Edwards 1986, 1091. 
In this investigation of priority, it is, I believe, not unwise to distinguish be- 
tween an inversion of Bernoulli’s theorem and Bayes’ theorem. Under the former 
we shall include results which advocate the estimation of an unknown probability 
p by the appropriate observed frequency x/n in a large number of trials, this 
approximation being made by considering Pr[/x/n - pi c ~1. This, of course, is 
very similar to the ~W&WYZ in Bayes’ theorem, except that there the endpoints 
of the interval (pl, p2) in which p is required to lie are not necessaiily functions of 
x and n. A careful examination of the difference between these two theorems is 
undertaken in this paper, and in the light of this examination it is suggested that 
the passage from [Hartley 17491 is more in line with the inverse Bernoulli theorem 
than with Bayes’ result. 
2. BERNOULLI’S THEOREM 
Before discussing the inverse Bernoulli theorem it is perhaps worthwhile to 
spend a few moments on the direct result, to get a precise idea of the assumptions 
made and the probability estimated. In the fourth part of his posthumously pub- 
lished AI-S Conjectundi of 1713, James Bernoulli published a result which he 
described in the following terms 121: 
This therefore is that problem, which I have proposed worthy of being published in this place, 
after I have suppressed it till now for twenty years, and of which not only the novelty, not 
only the very great utility, but also the concomitant difficulty, is able to superadd weight and 
worth to all the remaining chapters of this doctrine. [Bernoulli 1713, 2501 
This statement is preceded by the following example: suppose that an urn 
contains white and black pebbles in the ratio 3000 : 2000. Sampling from the urn is 
conducted with replacement, the person effecting the draws being ignorant of the 
true ratio of white to black pebbles present in the urn. Then, says Bernoulli, 
It is asked, whether you can do this so often, that it becomes ten times, a hundred times, a 
thousand times more probable (h.e. so that at length it emerges as morally certain) that the 
numbers of times in which you choose white and in which black will have the same ratio to 
each other-3 : 2-as the actual numbers of pebbles, like that of cases, enjoy, rather than any 
other ratio at all that is different from that one? [Bernoulli 1713, 249] 
He then goes on to say that this is in fact the case, and that it will be proved in the 
following chapter that moral certainty is reached in this way. 
The major result of Part IV is the fohowing: 
Therefore let the number of fruitful [successful] cases to the number of unfruitful [unsuccess- 
ful] cases be either exactly or approximately in the ratio r/s, and to the same degree to the 
total number in the ratio r/(r + S) or r/t, the limits (r + 1)/t 8~ (r - 1)/t determine [restrict] this 
ratio. Our task is to show, that one may run so many trials, that, given as many times as you 
like (say c), it emerges as more likely that the number of successful cases will fall within 
rather than outside these limits, h.e. the number of successful to the number of all observa- 
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tions will have a ratio neither greater than (r + 1)/r, nor less than (r - 1)/l. [Bernoulli 1713, 
2571 
Since 
Cr - 1)/t < rzs/fz < (r + 1)/t e ins/n - r/t1 < l/f (0 
(where ?zs and nF denote respectively the numbers of successes and failures in rz 
trials), it follows that the theorem may be rephrased as: given c, one can find n = 
ns + rzF such that 
Pr[[n&z - r/t1 < l/t] : Pr[j~~s/rz - r/t1 2 l/t] : :c: 1. m 
Note that JJ = r/t is the probability of success: it is generally &ken that p is a 
population frequency, and although this is not explicitly stated, it is probably a fair 
conclusion to draw from the statement of the theorem (cf. [Sung 1966, 41). 
Bernoulli’s aim in this regard, as stated in a letter of 3 October 1703 to G. W, 
Leibniz, was expressed as follows: 
Thereupon I began to reflect, whether or not that which is concealed from us a priori by 
chance, can at least become known to us a posteriori, by an event observed many times in 
similar instances. [Leibniz 1856, 771 
But the difficulty he experienced in trying to solve this problem “which has no 
slight recommendation by virtue of its difficulty, and has by far the greatest 
recommendation by virtue of its usefulness” [Leibniz 1856, 771 caused him to 
hesitate in publishing his investigations. 
Further evidence that Bernoulli planned to use his result in arguing from sample 
to population frequencies is given in the following quotation: 
Verily to be sure, another way is open to us here, by which we may obtain that which is 
sought; & what it is not granted to find out a priori, it will at any rate be permitted to extract a 
posteriori, that is, from a result perceived many times in similar instances; since it ought to be 
assumed that every single thing is able to happen and not to happen in future in as many cases 
as it will have been observed formerly in similar circumstances to have occurred and not to 
have occurred. [Bernoulli 1713, 2481 
Bernoulli proposes here [1713, 2491 to put this empirical way of determining the 
number of cases by experiment (modus empiricus determinandi numeros casuum 
per experimenta) on a rigorous basis. However, the ratio determined in this way is 
merely to be taken in some approximate sense, it being bounded by two limits. 
The proof of this theorem in modem formulation (see, for example, [Lo&ve 
1977, 141) is too well known to be given here. However, attention should be drawn 
to the discussion by I. Hacking [1975, Chap. 171 of this part of the Ars Conjec- 
tandi, and also to the pertinent comments of Keynes [1921, Chaps. 29-311, the 
latter being sometimes unwarrantably glossed over in considering the result. 
Bernoulli asks how many trials must be made so that the probability F’r[(r - 1)/t 
s ns/n s (r + 1)/t] should achieve some given value. After answering this ques- 
tion, he considers an example in which r : s ::3:2(wherer+s=t).Heshowsthat 
it is sufficient to take 25,500 trials in this case to ensure that the ratio of the 
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number of successes to the total number of events lies between 31/50 and 29/50, 
with odds of c = 1000 to 1. This is followed by similar illustrations with c = 10,000 
and c = 100,000, and is indeed a correct application of the result. As F. N. David 
correctly points out, this example “is a straightforward argument in direct proba- 
bility” [David 1962, 1371. 
However, the discussions of this part of Bernoulli’s essay by both I. Todhunter 
[1865, art. 1251 and David are misleading, in that they convey the impression that 
Bernoulli then proposed, in the context of the previous example, an inverse use of 
his result. Todhunter’s argument runs as follows (David’s is similar): suppose an 
urn to contain white and black balls in an unknown ratio. IfR + S draws result in 
R white and s black balls, the ratio of white to black balls should (according to 
Bernoulli, says Todhunter) be taken as approximately R : S. 
In fact, after the argument by Bernoulli discussed above, the memoir continues: 
Whence finally this singular rest& is seen to fohow, that if observations of ah events were to 
be continued through all eternity (the probability finally ending in complete certainty) all 
happenings in the world would be observed to occur in fixed [definite] ratios and according to 
a constant law of change; to such a degree that even in the most accidental and fortuitous 
happenings we would be bound to recognize [acknowledge] a sort of inevitability as it were 
and, so to say, a necessity ordained by fate. [Bernoulli 1713, 2591 
There is no further pertinent discussion; and although one may deduce the intent 
to make an inverse application of the theorem, I doubt that one can find here an 
explicit result (cf. [Hacking 1975, 149, 1541). 
Bernoulli had much correspondence with Leibniz on the theorem which today 
bears his name [3]. While, as Todhunter [1865, art. 1261 and David [1962, 1331 
have pointed out, Leibniz queried Bernoulli’s inverse result, it seems that he was 
not in fact questioning the correctness of the passage from a legitimate result for 
known p to an illegitimate one for unknown p, but that his concern was rather, as 
he wrote, “that happenings which depend upon an infinite number of cases cannot 
be determined by a finite number of experiments” [Sung 1966, 721. 
At James Bernoulli’s death, then, one was left with a careful proof of the direct 
theorem and a hint at the inverse result. The latter theorem received further 
mention some 40 years after Bernoulli’s death, and it is to this that we now turn 
our attention. 
3. THE RESULT IN HARTLEY’S BOOK 
The passage leading Stigler to the belief that Bayes was perhaps not the origina- 
tor of the result which today bears his name occurs in a book published by David 
Hartley in 1749. The pertinent section reads as follows: 
Mr. de Moivre has shewn, that where the Causes of the Happening of an Event bear a fixed 
Ratio to those of its Failure, the Happenings must bear nearly the same Ratio to the Failures, 
if the Number of Trials be sufficient; and that the last ratio approaches to the first indefinitely, 
as the Number of Trials increases. . An ingenious Friend has communicated to me a 
Solution of the inverse F’robIem, in which he has shewn what the Expectation is, when an 
Event has happened p times, and failed q times, that the original Ratio of the Causes for the 
Happening or Failing of an Event should deviate in any given Degree from that of p to q. And 
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it appears from this Solution, that where the Number of Trials is very great, the Deviation 
must be inconsiderable: Which shews that we may hope to determine the Proportions, and, 
by degrees, the whole Nature, of unknown Causes, by a sufficient Observation of their 
Effects. [Hartley 1749, 338-3391 
The first part of this quotation refers to Bernoulli’s theorem (or, more correctly, 
to de Moivre’s generalization thereof), while the second provides a clear state- 
ment of the inverse result. Replacing p by os (the number of successes or “hap- 
penings”) and q by & (the number of failures) and denoting by ps and pr the 
(numbers-or probabilities?- of) causes for the success or failure, respectively, 
of the event in question, we see that what Hartley’s “ingenious Friend” has 
discussed may be written as 
‘%~&hF - PSbFi = +S, nF1 (V& > 0) (3) 
(the use of “expectation” rather than “probability” here is not a problem). Fur- 
thermore, 
if (ns + nr) is large, j&nr-ps/prj will be small. (4) 
The numbers ns and & are clearly stated to be known, as is the “given Degree” 
as measured by s, while the original (or initial) ratio of causes is unknown. (It 
seems that one may interpret ps/pr as a ratio either of nU&er.r or of protmbili- 
ties). 
4. DE MOIVRE’S DOCTRINE OF CHANCES 
We now turn to the third edition of 1756 of de Moivre’s Doctrine ofChunces [41. 
Although chiefly devoted to problems of games of chance, this work contains two 
passages in which de Moivre mentions the argument from frequencies to probabil- 
ities. The first of these passages may be found in the corollary to Problem LXX11 
(concerned with finding the expectation of a spectator who is to receive a certain 
amount depending on the outcome of a game). Here de Moivre writes 
if after taking a great number of Experiments, it should be observed that the happenings or 
failings of an Event have been very near a ratio of Equality, it may safely be concluded, that 
the Probabilities of its happening or failing at any one time assigned are very near equal. [De 
Moivre 1756, 240-2411 
A generalization of this problem follows in Problem LXXIII, and this is in turn 
followed by a corollary in which we find the following words: 
if after taking a great number of Experiments, it should be perceived that the happenings and 
failings have been nearly in a certain proportion, such as of 2 to 1, it may safely be concluded 
that the Probabilities of happening or failing at any one time assigned will be very near in that 
proportion, and that the greater the number of Experiments has been, so much nearer the 
truth will the conjectures be that are derived from them. [De Moivre 1756, 2421 
One may well write this as 
for large n, P&F = r&/r@ (3 
(compare (4) above). 
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Further to this question, de Moivre attached to this edition of The Docfrine 
CJ~ Chunces a translation of his pamphlet of 12 November 1733, Approximatio 
ad Summam Terminorum Binomii xn in Seriem expansi, in which he took 
a look at “the hardest Problem that can be proposed on the Subject of Chance” 
[De Moivre 1756, 2421 (this problem is essentially the inverse use of Bernoulli’s 
theorem). The following results are pertinent: 
LEMMA. If an Euent be so dependent on Chance, as that the Probabilities of its happening 
orfailing be equal, and that a certain @en number n of Experiments be taken to observe how 
often it happens and fails, and also that 1 be another given number, less than in, then the 
Probability of its neither happening more frequently than &I + 1 times, nor more rarely than 
jn - 1 times, may be found as follows. [De Moivre 1756, 245-2461 
We need not worry about the solution (found by summing appropriate terms of the 
binomial (1 + lp, suitably expanded, and dividing by 2”); it is more useful to our 
present investigation to note that, since (in our previously introduced notation) 
in - 1 < r2.y < in + 1 e /n&l - 41 < i/n, 
the quaesitum becomes 
Pi&./n - 41 < l/nips = $, n]. 6) 
(De Moivre then considers various values of 1.) In Lemma 3 the condition that ps = 
pr is dropped, and we have the following result: 
LEMMA 3. If an Event so depends on Chance, as that the Probabilities of its happening or 
failing be in any assigned proportion, such as may be supposed of a to b, and a certain 
number of Experiments be designed to be taken, in order to observe how often the Euent will 
happen orfail; then the Probability that it shall neither happen more frequently than so many 
times as are denoted by an/(a + b) + 1, nor more rarely than so many times as are denoted by 
an/(a + b) - 1, wil/ be found as follows. [De Moivre 1756, 2491 
Again we need not concern ourselves with the solution proposed; the probability 
desired is seen to be 
Wbdn - PSI .c U~PS, 4, (7) 
since ps :pF :: a : b implies a/(a + b) = ~&IS + &$) = ps. This seems to be 
essentially the result that Hartley attributes to de Moivre. 
After the tenth corollary (with which the original Latin memoir concluded-see 
[Archibald 1926]), de Moivre presents in the translation two “Remarks” which 
are not without bearing on our present discussion. In the first of these he states 
that 
chance very little disturbs the Events which in their natural Institution were designed to 
happen or fail, according to some determinate Law. [De Moivre 1756, 2501 
He quotes some numerical applications of the lemmata mentioned above, and 
concludes by saying that 
in all Cases it will be found, that altho’ Chance produces Irregularities, still the Odds will be 
infinitely great, that in process of Time, those Irregularities will bear no proportion to the 
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recurrency of #XU Order w&z/r rmturulfy rewh from ORIGINAL DESIGN. [De Moivre 
1756, 2511 
In the second remark de Moivre presents an inverse argument: 
As, upon the Supposition of a certain determinate Law according to which any Event is to 
happen, we demonstrate that the Ratio of Happenings will continually approach to that Law, 
as the Experiments or Observations are multiplied: so, conversely, if from numberless Obser- 
vations we find the Ratio of the Events to converge to a determinate quantity, as to the Ratio 
of P to Q; then we conclude that this Ratio expresses the determinate Law according to which 
the Event is to happen. [De Moivre 1756, 2511 
5. BAYES AND PRICE 
In his letter to John Canton, in which he introduces Bayes’ Essay, Fjrice writes: 
Mr. de Moivre, . . . has in his Z,aws ofC/rarrce*, after Bernoulli, and to a greater degree of 
exactness, given rules to find the probability there is, that if a very great number of trials be 
made concerning any event, the proportion of the number of times it will happen, to the 
number of times it will fail in those trials, should ditfer less than by small assigned limits from 
the proportion of the probability of its happening to the probability of its failing in one single 
trial. [Bayes 1763, 372-3731 151 
This result can be written as follows: 
for large n, WI&F - p&d -c elv @I 
the evaluation of this probability requiring knowledge of ps. 
Since ]Q/Q -ps/prj < 8 3 jns/rr - psi < &, it is clear that smallness of the prob- 
ability in (8) will be implied by smallness of 
mh - PSI ‘L 4, (9) 
an expression which should be compared with (7) above. 
Price then goes on to say, 
But I know of no person who has shewn how to deduce the solution of the converse problem 
to this; namely, “the number of times an unknown event has happened and failed being given, 
to find the chance that the probability of its happening should lie somewhere between any two 
named degrees of probability.” What Mr. de Moivre has done therefore cannot be thought 
sufficient to make the consideration of this point unnecessary. [Bayes 1763, 3731 
This problem is exactly that considered by Bayes-with the addition of the words 
“in a single trial” after “the probability of its happening.” The solution of this 
problem, as I have indicated before [Dale 1982,271, is given in Bayes’ Proposition 
10, and the quaehm is: for given pl, pz E [O, 11, 
fibI s PS 5 !&S, nFl* WV 
Here ps is of course unknown. (Note that the choice pi = ns/nr - a, pi = m/r@ + 
.z yields Pr@zs/n - ps] < .$s, nr], and compare the result from Hartley’s book, 
discussed in Section 3 above.) 
As we have already noted, the idea of the argument from observed frequencies 
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to unknown probabilities is not original to Bayes; the rne#ro~ of solution, and the 
formulation of the problem, seem, however, to be given in print for the first time in 
Bayes’ memoir. 
6. LAPLACE’S CONTRIBUTION 
The authors considered thus far have each discussed only one method of inver- 
sion: for a discussion of both, and a comparison of the results obtained by the 
different methods, we now turn to Laplace’s Thkorie unulytique des probabilitks 
[1820], which contained perhaps the first clear realization of the distinction be- 
tween the two results. 
In the third chapter, entitled “Des lois de la probabilite qui resultent de la 
multiplication ind&mie des evenements,” of the second volume of this work, 
Laplace considers Bernoulli’s theorem. There he shows that, ifp and 1 - p are the 
respective probabilities of two events A and B, then in a very large number of 
trials (“COUPS”), 
(i) the most probable of all combinations which can arise is that in which each 
event is repeated proportionally to its probability; and 
(ii) the probability that the difference between the ratio of the number of times 
that the event A can occur to the total number of trials, and the “facilite” p of that 
event, lies between the limits 




where n is the total number of trials in which A occurred x times and B occurred x ’ 
times, t = l&/s, and 1 is that term in the expansion of [p + (1 - p)p+~’ 
which contains pZ-l(l - pF’+*. 
Although I do not intend to prove this result here, it is perhaps not inadvisable 
briefly to outline some steps in Laplace’s procedure. To this end, suppose that p 
and q = 1 - p are the (initial) probabilities of the events A and B, respectively. 
Denoting by X the random variable indicating the number of times A occurs in n 
trials, what we require is Pr[om < X c /3&t, p]. 
Now the probability that A and B occur x and x’ = rz - x times, respectively, is 
the greatest value of which is achieved whenp : 1 - p :: x : x’. Laplace then shows 
that Pr[x - r C X C x + rjn, p] is approximately 
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(13) 
the approximate value of the sum of (2r + 1) terms of the expansion [p + (1 - P)]~; 
the greatest term in this expansion is the middle term in the (2r + 1) terms. Writing 
x = np + z and t = rfi/s, we see that (13) gives the probability 
Pr[np + z - tVZF/bG 5 X 5 np + z + tSlV%] (141 
or 
Pr[z/n - t-In& 5 Xln - p 5 zln + tVZP/nCn]. 
This is the result given in (1 I) above, and is as far as Laplace takes the direct 
result, although some remarks not pertinent to our present investigations follow. 
Both Keynes [1921, Chap. 301 and Todhunter [1865, art. 9931, however, carry 
the argument further. Supposing that for large n, z may be ignored in comparison 
with np, we have xx ’ = n2pq. In this case the probability (15) becomes 
Pr[- t~llh s X/n - p 5 t-G], (161 
which is given approximately by 
(17) 
The latter expression is in fact the only one given by Keynes, who makes no 
mention of the expressions (13) and (14), the only ones given by Laplace. 
Laplace proceeds next to an inverse form of the theorem, writing 
if one knows the number of times that in n trials the event a [=A] has happened, the formula 
(0) [=(12)] will give the probability that its facility p, supposed unknown, will be included 
within the given limits. [Laplace 1820, 2861 
This is shown as follows: denoting by i the number of times that A occurs in the n 
trials, Laplace states that his preceding result gives the probability that i/n - p 
will be contained within the limits 
where T is the limit of t. Since TV?%?/n& is of order l/fi, and since terms of 
order l/n are neglected in deriving the approximations, one may substitute i for x 
and n - i for x’, with the result that the limits in (18) become 
+ Td2i(n - i) - 
nvx - 
(19) 
It thus follows that the probability that the “facilite” p of A lies within the limits 
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is given by 
From this Laplace draws the conclusion that, as n increases, the interval of the 
limits contracts, and the probability that JI falls within these limits approaches 1. 
“C’est ainsi que les evenements, en se developpant, font connaitre leurs probabi- 
lit&s respectives” [Laplace 1820, 2871. 
One sees then, in this result, a precise formulation and proof of the inverse 
Bernoulli theorem. The importance of the direct theorem in effecting this proof 
shouid aiso be noted. 
However, Laplace’s discussion does not end here. He proposes an alternative 
method (for trenchant criticism of which see [Keynes 1921, Chap. 301). 
One reaches these results directly, on consideringp as a variable which may extend from zero 
to one, and on determining, after the observed events, the probability of its various values, as 
one will see when we come to discuss the probability of causes inferred from observed 
events. [Laplace 1820, 2871 
This alternative procedure is discussed in Chapter 6, “De la probabilite des causes 
et des evenements futurs, tiree des evenements observes,” where, under the 
assumption that all values of the probability p of a simple event are u priori equally 
likely, and denoting by y(p) the probability of the observed result, Laplace derives 
(a generalization of) Bayes’ theorem: 
(He also considers [p. 3711 the case in which the values of p are not equally 
possible: the difference this makes to (21) is not germane here.) Denoting by u the 
most probable value of p (i.e., that which maximizes y(p)), Laplace shows that 
Pr[u - t&/k < p < a + t&/k] = L r eeu2 du. 
IGo 
Here it is supposed that y has factors which are functions of x raised to large 
powers of order l/o (a being a very smali fraction) and 
with Y = y(a). 
Taking y(p) = px(l - py’, Todhunter [1865, art. 9971 shows that (22) becomes 
(in the notation used before) 
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A remark similar to that following (20) above now follows, and there is also an 
extension to simple events of two different kinds. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The solution of the problem of the inference from observed frequencies to 
unknown probabihties may be attempted in two ways: either by an inversion of 
Bernoulli’s theorem or by Bayes’ theorem. The difference between these results 
was considered in the first section of this paper. 
The inference from (observed) frequencies to (unknown) probabilities is but ill- 
expressed by both Bernoulli and de Moivre: both of these savants proved a result 
in the converse direction and seemed to believe that the argument from frequen- 
cies to probabilities was a fairly obvious deduction from this result. Bayes pre- 
sented a reasoned case for the latter argument, and his result was later repeated by 
Laplace, who also gave a proof of Bernoulli’s theorem from which he deduced a 
“converse” result. 
In a recent paper [Dale 19861, I discussed an extract from a notebook ascribed 
to Bayes, in which a proof of one of the rules given in his Essuy [1763] is to be 
found. This extract, which occupies pages 81-83 of the notebook, is undated, 
whiIe the entry on page 51(a) is headed “Paris July 4, N.S. 1746” and that on page 
86 is headed “Estimate of the National debt upon 31 Dec. 1749.” It seems reason- 
able then to date the entry referring to the rule as somewhere between 1746 and 
1749. Noting that many passages in the notebook seem to be notes on various 
mathematico-physical texts (cf. [Home 1974-1975, 82]), and recalling that 
Hartley’s book was published in 1749, one might well suspect that the latter work 
influenced Bayes. This supports opinions expressed by Edwards [1986] and 
Stigler [ 1983]. 
From the excerpts discussed in this paper, however, I believe it is clear that the 
inference proposed by Hartley’s “ingenious Friend” for arguing from observed 
frequencies to unknown probabilities is more in line with an inverse application of 
Bernoulli’s theorem than with Bayes’ theorem. Although the idea of such an 
argument is not original to Bayes, the evidence considered here is, I believe, not 
sufficient to remove him from his place as originator of the method to be adopted. 
APPENDIX 
1. This therefore. . . this doctrine. Hoc igitur est illud Problema, quod evulgan- 
dum hoc loco proposui, postquam jam per vicennium pressi, & cujus turn novitas, 
turn summa utilitas cum pari conjuncta difficultate omnibus reliquis hujus doctri- 
nae capitibus pondus 8z pretium superaddere potest. 
Comment. Both David [1%2, 1361 and Sung [1966,42] translate “superaddere” 
as “exceed,” thus conveying the impression that the novelty, etc., of the problem 
exceed the value of the rest of the treatise; it is doubtful, however, whether such a 
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translation is warranted. The translations of de Moivre [1756,254] and Haussner 
[1899 II, 921, however, agree with that given here. 
2. It is asked, . . . ~~CWZ that one? Quaeritur, utrum toties hoc facere possis, ut 
deculpo, centuplo, millecuplo &c. probabilius fiat (h.e. ut moraliter tandem cer- 
turn evadat) numeros vicium, quibus album & quibus nigrum eligis, eandem ra- 
tionem sesquialteram, qua ipsi calculorum ceu casuum numeri gaudent, inter se 
habituros, quam aliam quamlibet rationem ab ista diversam? 
3. Therefore let . . . than (r - Z)/t. Sit igitur numerus casuum fertilium ad 
numerum sterilium vel praecise vel proxime in ratione r/s, adeoque ad numerum 
omnium in ratione r/(r + s) seu r/t, quam rationem terminent limites (r + 1)/t & 
(r - 1)/t. Ostendendum est, tot posse capi experimenta, ut datis quotlibet (puta c) 
vicibus verisimilius evadat, numerum fertilium observationurn intra hos 
limites quam extra casurum esse, h.e. numerum fertilium ad numerum omnium 
observationum rationem habiturum net majorem quam (r + 1)/t, net minorem 
quam (r - 1)/t. 
4. Thereupon I began . . . instances. Hint coepi cogitare, annon forte quod a 
priori nos latet, saltem nobis innotescere possit a posteriori, ex eventu in similibus 
exemplis multoties observato. 
5. Which has no . . . usefulness. Quod difficultatis commendationem non par- 
vam, utilitatis longe maximam habet. 
6. Verily to be sure . . . haue occurred. Verum enimvero alia hit nobis via 
suppetit, qua quaesitum obtineamus; 8~ quod a priori elicere non datur, saltem u 
posteriori, hoc est, ex eventu in similibus exemplis multoties observato eruere 
licebit; quandoquidem praesumi debet, tot casibus unumquodque posthac con- 
tingere 8z non contingere posse, quoties id antehac in simih return statu contigisse 
& non contigisse fuerit deprehensum. 
7. Whencefinally . . . by fute. Unde tandem hoc singulare sequi videtur, quod 
si eventuum omnium observationes per totam aeternitatem continuarentur (proba- 
bilitate ultimo in perfectam certitudinem abeunte) omnia in mundo certis rationi- 
bus & constanti vicissitudinis lege contingere deprehenderentur; adeo ut etiam in 
maxime casualibus atque fortuitis quandam quasi necessitatem, 8z, ut sic dicam, 
fatalitatem agnoscere teneamur. 
8. Zf one knows . . . given limits. Si l’on connait le nombre de fois que sur n 
coups l’evenement u est arrive, le formule (0) donnera la probabilite que sa facilite 
p, supposee inconnue, sera compris dans les limites donnees 
9. One reaches . . . obserued events. On parvient directement k ces resultats, 
en considerant p comme une variable qui peut s’etendre depuis zero jusqu’a 
l’unite, et en determinant, d’apres les evenements observes, la probabilite de ses 
diverses valeurs, comme on le verra, lorsque nous traiterons de la probabilite des 
causes deduite des evenements observes. 
NOTES 
1. Saunderson, blind from 12 months of age, was the fourth Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at 
Cambridge, succeeding, in 1711 at the age of 29, William Whiston, who had in turn succeeded Newton. 
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2. For the original of this and other translations, see the Appendix. All translations are by the 
present author. 
3. For a study of the possible influence of Leibniz on Bernoulli’s views on probability see 
[Schneider [1981, Sect. 41. 
4. See [Schneider 19681 for a detailed discussion of de Moivre’s work. The third edition of The 
Doctrine of Chances was prepared under the care of a friend of the author from the latter’s annotated 
and corrected copy. This edition, having been reprinted in 1967, is probably most readily accessible to 
the modem reader. 
5. The asterisk refers to a footnote, “See Mr. De Moivre’s Doctrine of Chances, p. 243, &c.” 
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